Public policy experts at Nextier have reported that over 100 military personnel and 200 civilians were killed by the Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria within five weeks.
The experts also said between November 2024 and April 2025, more than 252 attacks were recorded, with January 2025 recording the highest number of attacks by terrorists groups.
The Nextier SPD Policy Weekly report titled: “Re-thinking Nigeria’s Counterinsurgency Strategy: The Aftermath of the Boko Haram Resurgence,” was authored by Dr Ndu Nwokolo, Managing Partner at Nextier and Honorary Fellow at the School of Government, University of Birmingham, UK and Visiting Research Fellow at the Nathanson Centre on Transnational Human Rights, Crime, and Security, York University Canada and Dr Chibuike Njoku, an Associate Consultant at Nextier, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Advance Studies, Ile-Ife, and Senior Research Fellow, Institute Francais De Recherche en Afrique (IFRA-Nigeria).
The edition according to the report examined the current counterinsurgency strategy, analyzes the evolving dynamics of the insurgency, and proposes a comprehensive framework that integrates military efforts with governance reforms, inclusive dialogue, and socioeconomic revitalisation.
According to the report, Nigeria is witnessing a resurgence of Boko Haram activity, particularly in the North East and along its border regions, adding that the group has executed coordinated assaults that resulted in the seizure of three local government areas in Borno State, challenging state authority and obstructing humanitarian efforts.
It said: “Between November 2024 and April 2025, no fewer than 252 attacks were recorded, resulting in the deaths of over 100 military personnel and more than 200 civilians, highlighting not only the human toll but also the deteriorating security environment.
“The resurgence is further characterised by tactical diversification: Boko Haram’s factional groups of Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) have increased the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), launched ambushes on military convoys, and executed raids on internally displaced persons (IDP) camps and farming communities.
“Despite ongoing military operations and regional cooperation, JAS and ISWAP continue to pose a grave threat to national and regional stability in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region. The recent resurgence of attacks in hard-hit areas like Borno, Yobe, and parts of Adamawa underscores the limited success of current approaches that have prioritised mainly kinetic military actions over holistic, community-driven solutions.
“Reports from humanitarian organisations and conflict monitors have flagged growing fatigue within the military ranks, deteriorating civil-military relations, and increasingly sophisticated insurgent tactics.
“The re-emergence of targeted attacks on soft targets, ambushes on military convoys, and the abduction of civilians—including aid workers and schoolchildren—signals a dangerous escalation that current policy frameworks have failed to preempt.”
Giving an insights to the trends in violence, the Nextier-SPD report explained that recent data from November 2024 to April 2025 provides critical insights into the evolving dynamics of insurgent violence in Nigeria, highlighting the limitations of the current counterinsurgency strategy and underscoring the need for a more holistic, people-centred approach.
It said: “The number of recorded incidents fluctuated modestly, peaking in January 2025 (8 incidents) and March 2025 (7 incidents). However, the disparity between incident frequency and severity, especially concerning casualties, is striking.
“January 2025 alone recorded 92 deaths despite a relatively average number of incidents. This suggests an escalation in the lethality of attacks, raising questions about the effectiveness of deterrence and intelligence operations.
“Moreover, kidnap victims, an increasingly visible metric of insecurity, were recorded in February, March, and April 2025, with the highest in April (8 victims). This trend points to a diversification of tactics by insurgents and criminal elements, reflecting operational adaptation and exploiting gaps in state response capabilities.
“A glaring policy gap is the failure to integrate socioeconomic interventions meaningfully. Data patterns from the reporting period reveal that military victories do not necessarily translate to improved community security and stabilisation.
“The persistence of violence is compounded by poverty, youth unemployment, and poor access to education and services, which continue to create fertile ground for radicalisation.
“Additionally, the weak coordination among security agencies, reports of human rights abuses, and community resistance to the reintegration of former fighters have eroded trust and undercut intelligence gathering, key pillars of sustainable security. Given these trends, it is evident that the current strategy is reactive rather than preventative.”
The report stated that Nigeria’s counterinsurgency strategy against JAS and ISWAP has evolved over the past decade, reflecting kinetic and non-kinetic dimensions.
“Initially reliant on military force, the strategy has broadened to include regional security cooperation and soft power interventions to tackle radicalisation,” it said.
It noted that while the efforts have yielded measurable gains, persistent and emerging challenges continue to undermine the long-term success of Nigeria’s approach.
“On the kinetic front, the Nigerian Armed Forces, particularly the Air Force and specialised counterinsurgency units, have successfully recovered territory previously held by insurgents and dismantled several of their logistical strongholds.
“Precision airstrikes and joint military offensives have led to the elimination of high-value targets, weakening the operational capabilities of Boko Haram. These gains have been bolstered by Nigeria’s active participation in the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which has significantly enhanced cross-border intelligence sharing and coordinated actions among Lake Chad Basin countries, including Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. Such cooperation has disrupted insurgent movements and reduced safe havens across national boundaries.
“Complementing the military response, the Nigerian government has also invested in non-kinetic measures such as Operation Safe Corridor (OSC)—a deradicalisation, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DRR) program designed for repentant Boko Haram members.
“This initiative demonstrates a growing acknowledgement of the importance of addressing the psychological and ideological dimensions of violent extremism. Through psychosocial support, vocational training, and religious reorientation, OSC aims to facilitate the reintegration of former insurgents into society and break the cycle of radicalisation.
“However, these strategies face critical limitations that threaten their overall effectiveness. Foremost is the overreliance on military solutions, which has diverted attention and resources away from addressing the underlying structural drivers of extremism.
“Chronic poverty, high youth unemployment, weak state presence, and inadequate access to education and public services remain unaddressed, allowing insurgent groups to maintain a foothold in vulnerable communities.
“Furthermore, civil-military relations have suffered, with reports of human rights abuses by security forces contributing to widespread mistrust among local populations.
“This erosion of trust has had profound implications for community-based intelligence gathering, which is vital for anticipating and preventing attacks. Meanwhile, coordination among Nigeria’s various security agencies remains fragmented, undermining operational efficiency and prolonging the conflict.
“While Operation Safe Corridor has been praised for its innovative approach, it remains constrained by limited reach, insufficient post-reintegration support, and strong community resistance.
“Many communities are reluctant to accept ex-combatants, fearing retribution or infiltration, which undermines reintegration efforts and may increase the likelihood of re-radicalisation.
“In conclusion, although Nigeria’s counterinsurgency strategy has demonstrated significant tactical success, it lacks a comprehensive framework that addresses the root causes of insurgency.
“A more holistic and inclusive approach – integrating security, governance, and development—is urgently needed to achieve sustainable peace and stability in the North East and beyond.”
It stated that the Boko Haram’s resurgence reflects a dangerous transformation in its operational tactics, organisational structure, and recruitment methods.
It added that the groups, JAS, the ISWAP, and a new rumoured splinter group have demonstrated increased tactical sophistication, reverting to asymmetric warfare strategies such as guerrilla tactics, mobile hit-and-run operations, and the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
“These methods allow insurgents to remain agile, evade conventional military engagements, and strike strategic targets with minimal exposure. Additionally, they have expanded their activities through cross-border incursions, exploiting Nigeria’s porous frontiers with Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.
“These incursions facilitate arms trafficking, recruitment, and access to safe havens, further complicating Nigeria’s counterinsurgency response.
“Recruitment remains a central pillar of Boko Haram’s resilience. The groups continue to prey on the socioeconomic vulnerabilities of youth, particularly in rural and conflict-affected communities. Widespread poverty, lack of education, unemployment, and local grievances against state institutions create fertile ground for radicalisation.
“Through targeted propaganda and promises of belonging, financial reward, or divine purpose, JAS and ISWAP attract new fighters, even in areas previously deemed secure.
“A notable development is the further split between the two main terrorist groups, each adopting distinct strategies. ISWAP, for instance, focuses more on attacking military targets and establishing quasi-governance in occupied territories, whereas JAS is notorious for brutal attacks on civilians.”
It said that the increasing frequency of attacks on soft targets—such as schools, markets, religious sites, and IDP camps—illustrates a deliberate attempt to instil fear and undermine public trust in government protection.
“This trend reflects a broader strategy of weakening state authority while destabilising humanitarian operations and civilian life in conflict zones. With their strategy being different, a counterinsurgency approach that targets each group’s strategy will make a greater impact.
“Collectively, these dynamics highlight the need for Nigeria to recalibrate its counterinsurgency strategy, addressing not only military gaps but also the structural drivers of insurgency.”
It said addressing the resurgence of Boko Haram effectively requires a strategic policy shift from a primarily kinetic approach to a comprehensive and multi-dimensional counterinsurgency framework.
It recommended that Nigeria must recalibrate its security architecture by adopting a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach, strengthen community-based intelligence by engaging traditional leaders, vigilantes, and local networks to enhance early warning and deter surprise attacks.
It must also ensure security forces uphold accountability, minimise civilian harm, and build trust in conflict-affected areas.
The government must prioritise investments in education, vocational training, youth employment, and basic infrastructure in the North East as well as paying special attention to marginalised communities vulnerable to recruitment, ensuring inclusive service delivery and development planning.
The government should also tackle local grievances such as land disputes, lack of justice, and political exclusion will help to weaken the insurgents’ recruitment base and reinforce state legitimacy.
It should strengthen deradicalisation and reintegration programmes and Operation Safe Corridor must be expanded and restructured to ensure adequate screening, rehabilitation, and reintegration of former fighters.
It should also foster regional cooperation and diplomacy by strengthening cross-border collaboration through the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) with Cameroon, Niger, and Chad to disrupt Boko Haram’s networks.
Prioritise joint operations, intelligence sharing, and coordinated military efforts. Leverage support from the AU, ECOWAS, and global partners for capacity building, funding, and diplomatic backing for counterterrorism.
V. Drive Institutional Reform: Enhance civilian oversight of the security sector by empowering legislative and civil society actors to ensure transparency. Strengthen inter-agency coordination among the military, police, National Intelligence Agency (NIA), Department of State Services (DSS), and the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) to enable unified crisis response and effective post-conflict recovery.
